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Shall we Keep the Highly Skilled at Home? 





We examine how allowing individuals to emigrate to pay lower taxes abroad changes the 
optimal non-linear income tax scheme in a Mirrleesian economy. An individual emigrates if 
his domestic utility is less than his utility abroad net of migration costs, utilities and costs both 
depending on productivity. Three average social criteria are distinguished – national, citizen 
and resident – according to the agents whose welfare matters. A curse of the middle-skilled 
occurs in the first-best, and it may be optimal to let some highly skilled leave the country 
under the resident criterion. In the second-best, under the Citizen and Resident criteria, 
preventing emigration of the highly skilled is not necessarily optimal because the interaction 
between the incentive-compatibility and participations constraints may cause countervailing 
incentives. In important cases, a Rawlsian policymaker should decrease top marginal tax rates 
to keep everyone at home. 
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As noted by Mirrlees (1982) : ”High tax rates encourage emigration. The resulting loss
of tax revenue is widely believed to be an important reason for keeping taxes down.”
Nowadays in the OECD, many governments, notably in continental Europe, fear the
departure of their top-income earners to less redistributive countries. In this context,
France and Germany – among other countries – reduced their top income tax rates from
48.1% to 40% and from 48.5% to 45% respectively between 2003 and 2008. However,
it is always socially optimal to lower taxes in order to prevent top-income earners from
emigrating?
This article examines the asymmetric situation in which the redistributive income
tax policy of a highly redistributive country is challenged by the low tax policy of one of
its neighbours. We adopt the viewpoint of optimal taxation (Mirrlees, 1971) to address
this issue. The world consists of a highly redistributive country (”home”) and a less
redistributive country (”abroad”). The government of the former wants to improve
the well-being of the low skilled by taxing highly skilled individuals and redistributing
incomes. However, it must recognize that taxpayers will emigrate to the latter if taxes are
too high and thus take account of participation constraints for the individuals it wants
to keep at home. Because more productive individuals are likely to have more attractive
outside options (e.g., Hanson (2005) and Docquier and Marfouk (2006)), participation
constraints are type-dependent. We borrow these constraints from recent articles in
contract theory (see Lewis and Sappington (1989), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995),
and Jullien (2000)) and introduce them in the optimal income tax problem. To cast light
on the main economic eﬀects and keep the analysis suﬃciently manageable, we consider
the simple case in which the tax policy abroad is the laissez-faire, and foreigners are
immobile. It is possible to motivate this approach as a building block to a tax competition
model or to see the home country as part of a ”competitive fringe” to make an analogy
from industrial organization.
The social objective is complex to specify when individuals are allowed to vote with
their feet, because the set of agents whose welfare is to count depends on the income
tax itself (Mirrlees, 1982). We distinguish three social criteria. Under the National
criterion, the domestic government maximizes the average welfare of its citizens whilst
ensuring that every citizen lives at home. Under the Citizen criterion, it maximizes
the average welfare of its citizens, irrespective of their country of residence. Under the
Resident criterion, it maximizes the average welfare of its residents. We therefore address
a population problem in combination with the optimum income tax problem. As far as
2we know, the previous literature on optimum nonlinear taxation and individual mobility
always restricted itself to ﬁxed-population social criteria.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. When each individual’s produc-
tivity is public information (ﬁrst-best), it is socially optimal to prevent emigration of
the highly-skilled individuals under the Citizen criterion, which coincides therefore with
the National criterion at the optimum. By contrast, emigration of highly-skilled workers
may be socially optimal under the Resident criterion. In every case, there is a curse
of the middle-skilled workers at the optimum, instead of the curse of the highly skilled
described by Mirrlees (1974). Indeed, it is no longer possible to demand as much work as
without mobility from the highly skilled individuals, so the productive rent is extracted
maximally from the most productive individuals among those insuﬃciently talented to
threaten to emigrate. However, these middle-skilled workers cannot be taxed at will
because they would otherwise threaten to emigrate. Consequently, the redistribution in
favour of the low-skilled individuals has to be reduced.
When each individual’s productivity is private information (second-best), two quali-
tative properties of the optimal marginal tax rates are lost: they can be non-positive at
interior points and strictly negative at the top. Consequently, individual mobility does
not only render the tax schedule less progressive, but can also make the tax function de-
creasing. In fact, the small tax reform perturbation around the optimal tax scheme used
by Piketty (1997) and Saez (2001) has an additional participation eﬀect on social wel-
fare. This eﬀect favours a decrease in the optimal marginal tax rates even for individuals
below the productivity levels where the individuals threaten to emigrate. This new eﬀect
results in changes in Mirrlees’s formula to ensure that the optimal average tax rates are
compatible with the participation constraints of the individuals threatening to emigrate.
In addition, the interaction between the type-dependent participation constraints and
the incentive compatibility conditions can give rise to countervailing incentives, in which
case less skilled individuals want to mimic more skilled individuals because the latter
have more appealing outside options. Countervailing incentives cause an indirect social
cost of the presence in the home country of the highly-skilled individuals. When the
indirect cost due to countervailing incentives prevails over the beneﬁts of them staying
in the home country, implementing a tax schedule inducing them to emigrate increases
social welfare. We provide several conditions under which it is not the case. A Rawlsian
policymaker should decrease top marginal tax rates to impede emigration of taxpayers
in many relevant situations. In particular, this is true for quasilinear and separable
preferences under reasonable assumptions on the migration costs. A policymaker which
wants to maximise the welfare of the worst-oﬀ should design the income tax to keep the
3best-oﬀ at home.
As far as we know, Osmundsen (1999) is the ﬁrst to examine income taxation with
type-dependent participation constraints. He studies how highly skilled individuals dis-
tribute their working time between two countries. Because he directly uses the model
developed by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995), there is no individual trade-oﬀ between
consumption and leisure. By contrast, our model takes this trade-oﬀ into account. In
a recent article, Krause (2008) has examined income taxation and education policy
when there exist conﬂicting incentives for individuals to understate and overstate their
productivity. On average, highly-skilled individuals are better educated and can thus
beneﬁt from higher outside options when emigrating. Using quasilinear-in-leisure pref-
erences and a two-type model, diﬀerent possible regimes are identiﬁed but no optimal
tax scheme is characterized. In Simula and Trannoy (2006), we address the same issue
as in the present paper, where the income tax is linear. We show that it may be socially
optimal to let highly skilled leave the home country under the Resident criterion and
interpret this result as a lack of degrees of freedom oﬀered by a linear tax when agents
can vote with their feet. In Simula and Trannoy (2010), we examine the impact of the
threat of migration by highly skilled under a set of simplifying assumptions and derive
simple formulae for the top marginal income tax rates that we implement using French
data. In particular, we only consider the National social objective and thus migration
never actually occurs. Several articles have adopted the viewpoint of tax competition,
restricting attention to personalised lump-sum taxes (Leite-Monteiro, 1997), considering
a two-type population as in Stiglitz (1982) (Huber, 1999, Hamilton and Pestieau, 2005,
Piaser, 2003) or a population with many types (Brett and Weymark, 2008, Morelli, Yang,
and Ye, 2008). By contrast, Blackorby, Brett, and Cebreiro (2007) address the spatial
distribution of the population under optimal income taxes when governments cooperate
(or, equivalently, when there is a central tax authority).
Our article is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 examines
the ﬁrst-best allocations. Section 4 sets up the second-best income tax problem. Sec-
ond 5 studies the properties of the second-best optimal allocations under the National
Criterion, whilst Section 6 is devoted to the Citizen and Resident criteria. Section 7
concludes.
2. THE MODEL
The world consists of two countries, the home country A and the foreign country B.
All individuals are initially living in country A. Country A′s government implements a
4redistributive tax policy. Country B is a laissez-faire country. Both countries have the
same production function with constant returns to scale. Hence, productivity levels –
equal to pre-tax wage rates – are independent of the country in which an individual is
working.
Individuals diﬀer in productivity θ. Individual productivity is public knowledge in
the ﬁrst best and private information in the second best. The cumulative distribution





it admits a continuous and strictly positive density f.
2.1. Individual Behaviour
All individuals have the same preferences over consumption x and labour ℓ. If ℓ is the time
endowment, these preferences are represented by a cardinal utility function U : X → R,
where X :=
￿
(x,ℓ) ∈ R+ × [0,ℓ)
￿
.
Assumption 1. U is a C2 strictly concave function with U′
x > 0, U′
ℓ < 0, U′
x → ∞ as
x
> → 0 and U′
ℓ → −∞ as ℓ → ℓ.
Assumption 2. Leisure is a normal good.
A θ-individual working ℓ units of time has gross income z := θℓ. We call
u(x,z;θ) := U(x,z/θ) (1)











ℓℓ/θ2. The marginal rate of substitution of gross income for consumption







Each individual decides about the optimal amount of consumption and labour to
maximize his utility subject to his budget constraint. Country A’s government uses a
tax function T (θ,ℓ), with T (θ,ℓ) = T (θ) in the ﬁrst best and T (θ,ℓ) = T (θℓ) in the
second best. The utility maximization programme in country A implicitly deﬁnes the
consumption and labour supply functions in A, denoted xA (θ) and ℓA (θ) respectively.
The indirect utility in country A is thus VA (θ) := U (xA (θ),ℓA (θ)).
The utility maximization programme in country B deﬁnes implicitly the consumption
and labour supply functions in B, denoted xB (θ) and ℓB (θ) respectively. The indirect
utility in country B is VB (θ) := U (xB (θ),ℓB (θ)), which is strictly increasing in θ.
52.2. Emigration and Participation Constraints
An individual leaving country A pays a strictly positive migration cost, denoted c. Given
the cardinality of individual preferences, this cost can be expressed as a ”time-equivalent”
loss in utility, due to various material and psychic costs of moving: application fees,
transportation of persons and household’s goods, forgone earnings, costs of speaking a
diﬀerent language and adapting to another culture, costs of leaving one’s family and
friends, etc. ”[These migration] costs probably vary among persons [but] the sign of the
correlation between costs and wages is ambiguous” (Borjas, 1999, p. 12). We consider
that they depend on productivity and that their distribution is known to A’s government.
Hence, A’s government knows c(θ) when it knows θ, which is thus the sole parameter of
heterogeneity within the population. In addition:
Assumption 3. c : Θ −→ R++ is a C2 function satisfying c′ (θ) < V ′
B (θ).
The reservation utility is the maximum utility an individual staying in A can obtain
abroad. It is thus equal to VB (θ)−c(θ). Assumption 3 amounts therefore to considering
that the outside opportunities are increasing in productivity. This is in accordance
with many empirical studies, which ﬁnd that the propensity to migrate increases with
productivity (see, e.g., Sahota (1968), Schwartz (1973), Gordon and McCormick (1981),
Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980), Inoki and Surugan (1981), Hanson (2005) or Docquier
and Marfouk (2005)).
The location rent of a θ-individual is the excess of his indirect utility in country A
over his reservation utility, i.e.,
R(θ) := VA (θ) − VB (θ) + c(θ). (3)
An individual stays in country A if and only if
R(θ) ≥ 0, (4)
and therefore leaves country A if and only if R(θ) < 0.
A citizen is deﬁned as an individual born in country A; so all individuals have country
A’s citizenship. Individuals are committed to working in the country where they live.
Because the focus is on the mobility of highly skilled individuals, we consider that there is
a partition of citizens between country A and country B, with the less skilled individuals
being immobile and staying in country A. We therefore introduce a restriction on the
class of feasible tax schedules.
6Assumption 4. Country A’s resident population is a closed interval of types [θ, ˆ θ], with
ˆ θ ∈ Θ.
Without this assumption, the resident population in the home country might in prin-
ciple consist of several disjoint intervals. This possibility does not seem to be relevant,
given the issue we want to examine. Moreover, from a technical viewpoint, we then
would not be able to rely on classical optimal control theory to solve the policymaker’s
problem (Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987). We will see later that there are cases in which
the fact that country A’s resident population is a closed interval of types [θ, ˆ θ] is a
property of the optimum solution.1
We consider that country A’s government is not able to levy taxes in country B,
because the ﬁscal prerogative is closely linked to national sovereignty, and A is not
willing to redistribute income to the individuals staying in country B. Consequently,





the tax paid by an individual is equal to the diﬀerence between his gross income and
his net income, a tax policy is budget balanced if and only if it satisﬁes the tax revenue
constraint Z ˆ θ
θ
(zA (θ) − xA (θ))dF (θ) ≥ 0. (5)
In the rest of the paper, we denote by γ the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
budget constraint (5). Hence, one euro of tax revenue corresponds to γ units of social
welfare.
2.3. Social Criteria
Country A’s government is a benevolent policymaker which intends to implement the tax
policy corresponding to the best compromise between equity and eﬃciency. Its desire to
redistribute income is captured through its aversion to income inequality ρ ≧ 0. A zero
aversion corresponds to utilitarianism and an inﬁnite one to the Rawlsian maximin. The
social objective is more diﬃcult to specify than in a closed economy. Indeed, it does not
only depend on ρ which is captured through an isoelastic function ` a la Atkinson deﬁned
by φρ : R++ → R, φρ (U) = U1−ρ/(1 − ρ) for ρ  = 1 and φ1 (U) = lnU for ρ = 1, but
also on the answers to the following questions.
(i) Should we maximize total or average social welfare? Classical utilitarianism has
been criticized on the grounds that it leads to the so-called repugnant conclusion and
this is a signiﬁcant shortcoming (for details, see Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson
1This is the case in Propositions 3, 7, 8 and 9.
7(2005)). Average utilitarianism does not suﬀer from this drawback. So, we consider that
the government is interested in social welfare per capita, which allows us to compare
allocations diﬀering in population size.
(ii) Who are the agents whose welfare is to count? At least three social criteria
can be proposed, each of them corresponding to a speciﬁc answer. Under the National
criterion, country A’s government cares about the welfare of all its citizens and wants





φρ (VA (θ))dF (θ), with WN
A,ρ = −∞ for ˆ θ < θ. (6)
This objective corresponds to the mercantilist idea, formulated by Bodin (1578), that
”the only source of welfare is mankind itself”. Emigration should therefore be prevented
to keep the country prosperous. This social criterion provides a building block for the
solutions of the following Citizen and Resident criteria.
Under the Citizen criterion, country A’s government is concerned about the average
social welfare of its citizens, whether they are in country A or in country B. Under





φρ (VA (θ))dF (θ) +
Z θ
ˆ θ
φρ (VB (θ) − c(θ))dF (θ). (7)
This criterion rests on the idea that the ﬁscal system ﬁnds its legitimacy in its demo-
cratic adoption. Consequently, the welfare of every individual who has the right to vote
should be taken into account, irrespective of his country of residence2. When this ob-
jective is chosen, the optimal tax function depends on the choice of ˆ θ and determines an
allocation of country A’s citizens between country A and country B. Hence, country A’s
resident population is endogenous while the set of agents the welfare of whom matters
is exogenously ﬁxed.
Under the Resident criterion, country A’s government cares about the average social







φρ (VA (θ))dF (θ). (8)
2In France, the 14th Article of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which has
constitutional value, provides that: ”All citizens have the right to vote, by themselves or through their
representatives, for the need for the public contribution, to agree to it voluntarily, to allow implementa-
tion of it, and to determine its appropriation, the amount of assessment, its collection and its duration”.
Twelve senators represent the French citizens living abroad.
8This criterion is based on the idea that a public policy should take the welfare of all
taxpayers into account. Consequently, the welfare of the citizens living in country B does
not count. When this objective is chosen, the tax function as well as the set of agents
whose welfare is taken into account, depend on the choice of ˆ θ.3 WR
A,ρ(ˆ θ) is based on
average utilitarianism, which is known to face the Mere Addition Paradox: the addition
of individuals whose utility is less than the average utility in the initial population is
regarded as suboptimal, even if this change in population size aﬀects no one else and does
not involve social injustice. In the second-best framework, this paradox does not really
matter herein because we are focusing on emigration by the highly skilled individuals
initially living in country A, whose utility is greater than the maximum utility in A.
3. FIRST-BEST ALLOCATIONS
This section characterizes the ﬁrst-best allocations for which each individual’s produc-
tivity is public information. Consequently, country A’s government implements a tax
policy depending on productivity, i.e., T (θ,ℓ) = T (θ). We restrict attention to the tax
schedules which are continuous and diﬀerentiable almost everywhere.
We call V cℓ
A (θ) the indirect utility if country A, and use it as a benchmark. When ρ
is ﬁnite, the latter is decreasing in θ at the social optimum if and only if Assumption 2
holds (Mirrlees, 1974): there is therefore a curse of the highly skilled. When ρ is inﬁnite,
all individuals receive the same utility level.













. Otherwise, no one would
have an incentive to move abroad and the solution in open economy would be the same
as in closed economy.
Note that, in the ﬁrst best, individuals for whom the participation constraints are ac-
tive pay strictly positive taxes. Indeed, since VB (θ)−c(θ) < VB (θ) under Assumption 3,
the tangency point between their highest possible indiﬀerence curve and their budget con-
straint must be below the 45◦-line through the origin in the gross-income/consumption
space.
3.1. National criterion
Country A’s government chooses the tax paid by each individual or, equivalently, the
consumption-labour bundle intended for each individual.
3In other words, a population problem consisting in ”diﬀerent number choices” (Parﬁt, 1984) is
embedded in the optimal income tax problem.
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  (a)                                                                                   (b)
Figure 1: The curse of the middle-skilled
Problem 1 (National Criterion, First-Best). Choose (x,ℓ) in X to maximize WN
A,ρ, with
ˆ θ = θ, subject to (5) and
R(θ) ≥ 0 for θ ≤ ˆ θ. (9)














θ∗ the minimum productivity level for which the participation constraint (9) is binding.
A priori, there may exist larger skill levels for which the participation constraint (9) is
slack. The following proposition shows that this is not the case in the ﬁrst-best optimum
under the National criterion.
Proposition 1 (The Curse of the Middle-Skilled). The participation constraints are
binding between θ∗ and θ.
• When the government’s aversion to income inequality is ﬁnite, the optimum indi-
rect utility in country A is V-shaped in θ, minimum at θ∗.
• When the government’s aversion to income inequality is inﬁnite (maximin), the
optimum indirect utility in country A is constant up to θ∗ and then increasing.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1. On panel (a), the government’s aversion to in-
come inequality is ﬁnite. The θ∗-individuals are the worse-oﬀ when potential mobility is
10taken into account. On panel (b), the government is Rawlsian. The utility levels of the
individuals with productivity below θ∗ are reduced compared to the closed economy. In
both cases, the participation constraint separates the population into two intervals: it
is inactive below θ∗ and active above. Consequently, it is no longer possible to require
the most talented individuals to work as much as without mobility, i.e., to require them
to keep working even though labour disutility exceeds the gains from the increase in
income. It is therefore from the most productive individuals among those insuﬃciently
talented to threaten to leave the country that the productive rent is extracted to the
maximum. However, this rent cannot be extracted at will because of the participation
constraints. Redistribution in A is thus reduced and the situation of the low-skilled
individuals deteriorates.
3.2. Citizen Criterion
We examine if it is socially optimal to prevent emigration of the highly skilled individuals
under the Citizen criterion. The policymaker solves the following programme.
Problem 2 (Citizen Criterion, First-Best). Choose an allocation (x,ℓ) in X and ˆ θ in
Θ to maximize WC
A,ρ(ˆ θ) subject to the participation constraint (9) and the tax revenue
constraint (5).










We ﬁrst investigate whether it is optimal to keep everyone in the home country. For
this purpose, we assume that ˆ θ < θ is socially optimal. Individuals with productivity
ˆ θ are indiﬀerent between living in country A or in country B, which means that their
location rent R(ˆ θ) is zero. Individuals with productivity above ˆ θ emigrate to country
B. Because there is no net subsidy in country B, it is always feasible to make the latter
relocate to country A, without reducing the indirect utilities of country A’s residents, for
example in giving them their laissez-faire utility VB (or a bit more than their reservation
utility). Because c > 0 and φ′




φρ (VA (τ))dF (τ) +
Z θ
ˆ θ
φρ (VB (τ))dF (τ) >
Z ˆ θ
θ




φρ (VB (τ) − c(τ))dF (τ). (11)
The right-hand side of (11) is equal to WC
A,ρ(ˆ θ). Hence, letting the highly-skilled emigrate
from country B to country A is both feasible and welfare beneﬁcial, which contradicts
the premise. The optimum allocation has thus the following feature.
Proposition 2. Under the Citizen criterion, the optimal tax policy is the same as that
chosen under the National criterion.
3.3. Resident Criterion
The basic diﬀerence between the Citizen and Resident criteria is that the latter does
not take the welfare of citizens living abroad into account. Hence, it might be socially
desirable to let some individuals emigrate to country B under the Resident criterion.
Problem 3 (Resident Criterion, First-Best). Choose an allocation (x,ℓ) in X and ˆ θ in
Θ to maximize WR
A,ρ(ˆ θ) subject to the participation constraint (9) and the tax revenue
constraint (5).
By the envelope theorem and Leibnitz’s rule, the impact of a small increase in ˆ θ on























where 1ρ<∞ is the indicator function. The ﬁrst term of (12) corresponds to the ﬁscal
contribution of the individuals with productivity ˆ θ, expressed in social welfare per capita.
It is strictly positive. The second term is the contribution to social welfare of the marginal
individuals, in excess to average social welfare. It is divided by the size of the population
to obtain a per capita measurement.
When ρ is inﬁnite (maximin), the second term is equal to zero. Therefore, for any
ˆ θ > θ, the marginal individuals’ net contribution to social welfare is strictly positive. It
is thus socially optimal to keep everyone in the home country.
12When the aversion to income inequality ρ is ﬁnite, the sign of utility eﬀect is am-
biguous. There is a trade-oﬀ between the tax and the utility eﬀects of the marginal ˆ θ-
individuals. For example, let us consider that ˆ θ = θ. The utility eﬀect of the presence in


























when the reservation utility is quite
ﬂat. If the utility eﬀect is suﬃciently negative to counterbalance the positive tax eﬀect,
letting the most productive citizens leave the home country increases social welfare.4
4. SECOND-BEST ALLOCATIONS: PRELIMINARY RESULTS
We now turn to the characterization of second-best optimum allocations. The distri-
bution of characteristics in the economy remains common knowledge, but individual
productivity is now private information. Country A’s government is thus restricted to
setting taxes as a function of earnings, i.e., T (θ,ℓ) = T (z). Hence, it has to ensure that
the tax schedule is incentive compatible.
4.1. Statement of the Problem
We ﬁrst state the optimal income tax problem. A tax schedule T is incentive compatible
if and only if individuals living in country A have an incentive to reveal their type truth-
fully when it is implemented. By the revelation principle, the incentive-compatibility



















To deal with this uncountable inﬁnity of constraints, the Spence-Mirrlees property is
assumed to hold:
Assumption 5 (Single-Crossing). s′
θ (x,z;θ) < 0.
Under Assumption 5, the incentive-compatibility conditions (IC) are equivalent to:
V ′




z (xA (θ),zA (θ);θ) for θ ≤ ˆ θ, (FOIC)
zA (θ) non-decreasing for θ ≤ ˆ θ. (SOIC)
4In order to determine the optimal upper bound of the resident population b θ, the analogue of Problem
3 in which b θ is arbitrarily given in Θ is ﬁrst considered. Let W
R
A,ρ(b θ) be the social value function. The
optimal value of b θ is that for which W
R
A,ρ(b θ) is maximum.
13The proof of this equivalence is standard (see, e.g., Myles (1995)) and thus omitted.
The ﬁrst-order condition for incentive compatibility (FOIC) is an envelope condition
specifying how the indirect utility VA must locally change. Because V ′
A ≥ 0, VA cannot
be V -shaped as in the ﬁrst-best. The second-order condition for incentive compatibility
(SOIC) is a global monotonicity condition of gross income. The analysis will focus
on continuous mechanisms which possibly exhibit kinks at a ﬁnite number of points
corresponding to jumps in the marginal tax rates. In this case, the location rent R(θ)
is continuous and the second-order condition (SOIC) is equivalent to:
z′
A (θ) ≥ 0 for θ ≤ ˆ θ. (SOIC’)
Because country A’s government does not know who are the agents for whom the
location rent R(θ) is zero, we have to take into account both the participation constraint
and the condition for incentive compatibility for every resident staying in the home
country 5. The second-best optimal non-linear income tax problem can thus be written
as follows.
Problem 4 (Second-Best). Choose a tax schedule T (zA) to maximize social welfare
Wi
A,ρ, i = {N,C,R}, subject to the following constraints : (i) (FOIC), (SOIC’), (5), (9);
(ii) ˆ θ = θ when i = N and ˆ θ in Θ otherwise.
In the closed-economy version of Problem 4, ˆ θ is equal to θ and the participation
constraint (9) is not taken into account. Let V cℓ
A (θ) be the (second-best) optimum
indirect utility. If V cℓ
A (θ) ≥ VB (θ) − c(θ) for every θ in Θ, allowing individuals to
vote with their feet does not alter the social optimum. We place ourselves in the case
where there are individuals for whom V cℓ
A (θ) < VB (θ) − c(θ) because the participation
constraint would otherwise never be active.
Problem 4 raises three important diﬃculties, to which we are not confronted in a
closed economy. First, the participation constraint (9) can a priori bind on any subset
of the resident population, even at isolated points, because the location rent R(θ) is not
necessarily monotonic. Second, this constraint is a pure state constraint. The adjoint
variable may thus have jump discontinuities. Third, under the Citizen and Resident
criteria, the upper bound ˆ θ is free to vary between θ and θ.
In solving Problem 4, we assume that the adjoint variables have a ﬁnite number
of jump discontinuities and are C1 elsewhere. For later reference, we call ι the adjoint
5If the participation constraints (9) were not type-dependent, it would be necessary and suﬃcient to
check that they are satisﬁed at θ since (FOIC) ensures that the optimal utility path is non-decreasing.
14variable associated with (FOIC) and π′ ≥ 0 the Lagrange multiplier of (9), which corre-
sponds to the shadow price of a marginal increase in the reservation utility at θ.
In order to characterize the optimal income tax schedule, it is useful to introduce
a few additional deﬁnitions. We denote by π the shadow price of a uniform marginal
increase in the reservation utility for all θ′ ≥ θ. By deﬁnition, it is the non-decreasing
function, with derivative π′ almost everywhere, satisfying








We also call eH and eM the Hicksian and Marshallian elasticities of labour supply with
respect to the net-of-tax wage rate. Moreover, as shown by Saez (2001), the magnitude
of the uncompensated behavioural response of the τ-individuals to a small increase in













4.2. Optimal Tax Schedule for Individuals Threatening to Emigrate
Before looking at a speciﬁc social criterion, we derive properties which are satisﬁed by
all optimal tax schemes for the individuals threatening to emigrate.
For this purpose, let I be an interval of positive length where the participation
constraint (4) is active. By deﬁnition, for θ in I, we have R(θ) ≡ 0 and thus V ′
A (θ) =
V ′
B (θ) − c′ (θ). Hence, the rate of increase in the indirect utility the government has to
give to the individuals so that they reveal their private information, is equal to the slope
of the reservation utility on interval I. In addition, employing (FOIC) and rearranging
yield:
zA (θ) = −θ
V ′
B (θ) − c′ (θ)
u′
z (xA (θ),zA (θ);θ)






























for θ in I. (15)
The second-order condition for incentive compatibility (SOIC’) can only be satisﬁed on
interval I if the curly bracket in (15) is non-negative. When preferences are separable
15(u′′
xz = 0), one gets:
z′









B (θ) − c′′ (θ)
V ′
B (θ) − c′ (θ)
￿
, (16)
the LHS of which is negative because u′′
θz > 0 and u′
z < 0.
Property 1. Let preferences be separable (u′′
xz = 0) and consider an interval I of positive




B (θ) − c′′ (θ)
V ′
B (θ) − c′ (θ)
> −1 for θ in I. (17)
Condition (17) states that the elasticity of the marginal reservation utility to the
wage rate, evaluated at θ, is greater than −1 for every θ in I. To have further insight,
we now turn to quasilinear-in-consumption preferences
u(x,z;θ) = x − v (z/θ). (18)
We examine the curvature of the tax schedule along the participation constraint. We
consider that individual preferences are quasilinear in consumption as in (18), but we do
not specify the desutility of labour v (.). We call D = 1−T′ and we restrict ourselves to
cases in which 0 < D < 1. The ﬁrst-order condition of the individual utility maximisation
programme yields ℓA = v′−1(θD). The ﬁrst-order condition for incentive compatibility
is V ′
A (θ) = Dv′−1(θD). Along I, we have R′(θ) = 0, i.e., Dv′−1(θD) = V ′
B (θ) − c′ (θ),
which implicitly deﬁnes D as a function of the marginal outside option V ′
B (θ) − c′ (θ).





D2/v′′(v′−1(θD)) − (V ′′




B(θ) = 1/[v′′(v′−1(θ)]. The sign of T′′ is thus as follows:
T′′ < 0 ⇔
D2v′′(v′−1(θ)) − v′′(v′−1(θD)
v′′(v′−1(θ)v′′(v′−1(θD))
+ c′′ (θ) < 0. (20)
Property 2. Let individual preferences be quasilinear in consumption, the marginal
disutility of labour be concave, the marginal cost of migration be non-increasing in pro-
ductivity and consider 0 < T′ < 1. Then the optimal marginal tax rate decreases along
the participation constraints.
A suﬃcient condition for the optimal marginal tax rate to be negative along the
16participation constraint is therefore that v′′′ < 0 and c′′ ≦ 0: the desutility of working
an extra hour increases at a decreasing rate while the cost of migration is concave. The
ﬁrst condition corresponds to a psychological law, which can be tested empirically. The
second condition depends on the nature of the migration costs faced by the individuals.
5. SECOND-BEST ALLOCATIONS UNDER NATIONAL CRITERION
We now study the impact of the threat of migration on the optimum tax scheme in
country A when its government adopts the National criterion. This analysis provides a
building block for the analysis of the optimal tax schedule under the Citizen and Resident
criteria, that will be carried out in the next subsection. We start by examining conditions
under which the participation constraints generate a partition of the population in two
intervals. We then characterize the optimal income tax schedule, providing a formula
for the optimal marginal tax rates.
5.1. When the participation constraints generate a partition of the popula-
tion: suﬃcient conditions
We assumed in the last section that there is a non-degenerated interval I on which the
participation constraint is active. We now show that there are cases in which this is
actually the case. Moreover, we establish that under certain conditions the National
solution is such that the participation constraint generates a partition of the population
in two intervals.
To this end, we consider that individuals have quasilinear-in-consumption prefer-
ences and that the policymaker’s aversion to income inequality in inﬁnite (maximin).
We choose the exogenous parameters of the model so that (i) the autarkic second-best
indirect utility crosses the reservation utility only once, from above, and (ii) the reserva-
tion utility is convex. Assumption (i) is in line with the focus of the article in which the
threat of migration comes from individuals in the upper part of the skill distribution.
Assumption (ii) is equivalent to V ′′
B > c′′. It ensures that gross income is nondecreasing
along an interval where the participation constraint is active. Note that the indirect
utility abroad VB is convex when individual preferences are quasilinear.
Under these assumptions, we establish that – under the National criterion – the
participation constraint is binding on the interval [θ∗,θ], where θ∗ is the minimum pro-
ductivity level at which individuals threaten to emigrate. We know that the tax function
is continuous, and diﬀerentiable except on a set of measure zero. Consequently, the in-
direct utility VA and the location rent R are both piecewise continuously diﬀerentiable.
17We consider an allocation θ −→ (ˆ xA (θ), ˆ zA (θ)) which satisﬁes the incentive, participa-
tion and tax revenue constraints. If the participation constraint is slack at one point
above θ∗ (i.e., R(θ) > 0 for θ > θ∗), then this constraint is slack on an interval. We call
[θ−,θ+] this interval.
In the Appendix, we prove by contradiction that this allocation cannot be socially op-
timal. The idea is that it is possible to construct another feasible allocation for which tax
revenue is higher. This allocation θ −→ (ˇ xA (θ), ˇ zA (θ)) is such that (ˇ xA (θ), ˇ zA (θ)) =
(ˆ xA (θ), ˇ zA (θ)). Because the maximin objective is equivalent to maximising tax revenue,
this allocation is welfare-improving and thus the initial allocation cannot be optimum.
The following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 3. Let individuals have quasilinear-in-consumption preferences and con-
sider the National criterion with an inﬁnite aversion to income inequality (maximin).
If the autarkic second-best indirect utility crosses the reservation utility only once, from
above and the reservation utility is convex, then the optimum allocation is such that:
VA(θ′) = VB(θ′) − c(θ′) =⇒ VA(θ) = VB(θ) − c(θ) for every θ > θ′. (21)
Proof. See the Appendix.
We will use this proposition later to investigate cases in which the participation
constraint is binding on an interval at the optimum under the Citizen and Resident
criteria.
5.2. Optimal income tax rates
We now investigate the impact of the potential threat of migration on the optimal income
tax schedule.
Proposition 4. Under the National criterion and in the absence of bunching, the opti-
mal marginal tax rates are given by
T′ (zA (θ))
1 − T′ (zA (θ))
= A(θ)B (θ)C (θ) for θ < θ, (22)
where
A(θ) :=
1 + eM (θ)
eH (θ)
, B (θ) := B1 (θ) − B2 (θ) and C (θ) :=






















































































Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 extends Mirrlees’s (1971) optimal income tax formula to take the threat
of migration into account, using behavioural elasticities as in Saez (2001). It reﬂects the
trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equity, when the government has decided to maintain
the maximum national productive capacity by preventing its citizens from leaving the
country. A(θ) and C (θ) are the usual eﬃciency and demographic factors, respectively.
However, the value of A(θ) is usually not the same whether the individuals can or cannot
vote with their feet, because it depends on gross income which is endogenous. The factor
B (θ), which combines eﬃciency and equity, is the only factor not written as in Mirrlees’s
formula, in which the right-hand side of (22) reduces to A(θ)B1 (θ)C (θ). As previously
stated, the optimal marginal tax rates can be strictly negative at the top, and therefore
non-positive at interior points of the schedule.
We now turn to the diﬀerent channels captured in formula (22). We consider a small
tax reform perturbation around the optimal income tax schedule. A small increase dT
for gross income between z and z + dz has four eﬀects on social welfare. Three eﬀects
are already observed in closed economy and have been thoroughly examined by Saez
(2001).
• The three ”usual” eﬀects allow us to grasp A(θ), B1 (θ) and C (θ).
First, the local increase in the marginal rate of tax mechanically results in individuals
with gross income greater than z paying additional taxes. Second, the elasticity response
from the taxpayers with gross income between z and z+dz decreases their labour supply
and reduces tax revenue. Third, under Assumption 2, the increase in taxes paid by
19these individuals has an income eﬀect, leading them to work more, which is good for tax
receipts.
• The new participation eﬀect illuminates B2 (θ).
The tax reform perturbation mechanically results in an increase in taxes paid by
all individuals with gross income strictly above z. Consequently, those among them for
whom the participation constraints were already active now receive a utility below their
reservation level. Then the participation constraint (9) is no longer satisﬁed. These
individuals have to be compensated for the increase in taxes they face.
We ﬁrst examine compensation for the individuals with gross income between z and
zθ. The compensation eﬀect leads A’s government to totally compensate them for staying
in A. Each of them is given extra dTdz euros, which generate u′
x (xA,zA;τ) × dTdz
additional units of utility. Since π′ (τ) is the shadow price of the participation constraint
at τ and γ the Lagrange multiplier of the tax revenue constraint (5), the cost in terms






The compensation eﬀect combines with the usual income eﬀect. Because leisure is a
normal good under Assumption 2, the increase in the tax burden paid by all individuals
with income greater than z induces them to work more. This allows country A’s gov-
ernment to increase their taxes. As a result, it is not necessary to fully compensate the
potentially mobile individuals forthe increase in taxes they face. We know from Saez
(2001) that the magnitude of the uncompensated behavioural response is summarized by
Ψθτ ≥ 1, which converts the social marginal utility of consumption of the τ-individuals
u′
x (xA,zA;τ) into that of the θz-individuals u′
x (xA,zA;θz). Using (24), the social cost






By integration of (25), we get the cost of compensating the individuals with productivity
between θz and θ. For the individuals on the upper bound of the population, the social




















20Finally, by (25) and (26), the average social cost of the compensation of all potentially


















= B2(θz) × dTdz. (27)
B2(θz) is positive as soon as there are individuals with productivity above θz for
whom the participation constraints are binding. This term counters progressivity on a
range of gross income levels preceding that on which individuals hesitate to leave the
country. This is because increasing the marginal tax rates at θz makes the compensation
of all more productive individuals threatening to emigrate more costly in terms of social
welfare.
Eventually, the participation eﬀect results in the adjustment of the optimal marginal
tax rates to make the average tax rates compatible with the participation constraints.
Consequently, country A’s government should be particularly cautious about increasing
marginal tax rates, even at productivity levels where individuals do not hesitate to vote
with their feet.
6. SECOND-BEST ALLOCATIONS UNDER CITIZEN AND
RESIDENT CRITERIA
Under the National criterion, the whole population is constrained to stay in country A.
We now relax this constraint, in order to examine whether keeping everybody in the
home country is not too costly in terms of social welfare.
6.1. A Two-Step Problem
For this purpose, we separate Problem 4 into two subproblems to determine the op-
timal upper bound ˆ θ. In the ﬁrst subproblem, ˆ θ is arbitrarily chosen by country A’s
government.
Subproblem 1. For a given ˆ θ in Θ and i = {C,R}, choose an allocation (xA,zA)
to maximize social welfare Wi
A,ρ(ˆ θ) subject to the conditions for incentive compatibility
(FOIC) and (SOIC’), the tax revenue constraint (5) and the participation constraint (9).
Let Wi
A,ρ(ˆ θ) be the social value function of this subproblem, ιi
ˆ θ (θ) the shadow price
of incentive-compatibility constraint (FOIC), and πi
ˆ θ (θ) the shadow price of a uniform
21marginal increase in the reservation utility for all individuals with θ′ ≥ θ. The solution
in ˆ θ to Problem 4 is obtained as:
Subproblem 2. For i = {C,R}, choose ˆ θi in Θ which maximises Wi
A,ρ(ˆ θ).
Subproblem 1 is a generalization of the second-best National problem where the
upper productivity in country A is given exogenously . This implies that the optimal tax
schedules obtained under the National, Citizen and Resident criteria all share qualitative
properties.
Proposition 5. Under the Citizen and Resident criteria, the optimal marginal tax rates
are given by Proposition 4 with:




− F (θ), i = {C,R}.
• φ′
ρ (VA) is divided by F(ˆ θR) under the Resident criterion.
Proof. See the Appendix.
6.2. Countervailing Incentives and Upward Mimicking Behaviour
We are now prepared to examine the allocation of individuals between country A and
country B resulting from the implementation of the Citizen and Resident optimal income
tax schedules. For every ˆ θ in Θ, the ˆ θ-individuals are indiﬀerent between living in country
A or in country B. Let us assume ˆ θ < θ. Hence, individuals with productivity above ˆ θ
are in country B. Making them relocate to country A requires adjustments to prevent
them from imitating less productive individuals. It also brings about a new upward
mimicking behaviour: country A’s residents may now have an incentive to mimicking
the ˆ θ-individuals because they have the most appealing outside options.
The upward mimicking behaviour is crucial to understanding the interactions be-
tween the conditions for incentive compatibility and the type-dependent participation
constraint. In closed economy, individuals have the usual incentive to understate their
productivity to obtain greater social beneﬁt whilst enjoying more leisure.6 When type-
dependent participation constraints are taken into account, the individuals may also be
tempted to overstate their productivity, in working harder, to obtain greater compensa-
tion for staying in the home country. This behaviour reﬂects countervailing incentives.
6In the discrete population model of Guesnerie and Seade (1982), a suﬃcient condition for incentive-
compatibility of the tax scheme is that only the downward adjacent incentive-compatibility constraints
are binding (see also Weymark (1986, 1987) and Simula (2010)). Hellwig (2007) has established, in both
discrete and continuous models that under ”desirability of redistribution” only the downward incentive-
compatibility constraints are binding in a closed economy.
22An asymmetry in terms of informational constraints between the individuals with
productivity below ˆ θ and the marginal ˆ θ-individuals may therefore arise. Indeed, con-
trary to the former, the latter can only have the usual downward incentives. The cost
of making the θ-individuals reveal their private information may therefore drop at ˆ θ.
This cost is represented by ι(θ), which may thus have a downward jump discontinuity
ι(ˆ θ−) − ι(ˆ θ) ≧ 0 at this productivity level (we denote by minus the limit to the left).7
To make the individuals to the (very) left of ˆ θ reveal their type, their utility in A
must be increased. This rise mechanically reduces the shadow cost of participation for
these types, which is captured by πi
ˆ θ (θ). This eﬀect stops suddenly at ˆ θ. Consequently,
the shadow cost π (θ) may have an upward jump discontinuity π(ˆ θ) − π(ˆ θ−) ≥ 0, which
corresponds to the downward jump discontinuity in ι(θ) at ˆ θ. These discontinuities have
the same magnitude and vanish when the participation constraint is inactive at ˆ θ.
Lemma 1. ι(b θ−) − ι(ˆ θ) = π(ˆ θ) − π(ˆ θ−) ≥ 0 ( = 0 if the participation constraint is
inactive at ˆ θ).
Proof. See (A.34) in the Appendix.
They illustrate the non-trivial interactions that may arise between the incentive-
compatibility and participation constraints.
6.3. Eﬀects of the Presence of the Marginal Individuals on Social Welfare
A variational analysis provides insights into the costs and beneﬁts of the presence in
the home country of the marginal ˆ θ-individuals. It is useful to introduce the following
expressions.





• Utility Eﬀect: UE(ˆ θ) =
h




• Net Information Externality: IE(ˆ θ) = [ι(ˆ θ) − ι(ˆ θ−)]R′(ˆ θ) − ι(ˆ θ−)V ′
A(ˆ θ).





















7Note that ι – as well as π in the next paragraph – depend on the upper bound ˆ θ and on the chosen
welfare criterion. We do not show it explicitly to keep notations simple.
23Proof. See the Appendix.
We ﬁrst see that we recover the tax and utility eﬀects identiﬁed in the ﬁrst-best (10)
and (12): the channels identiﬁed in the ﬁrst-best still play a key part in the second-
best. However, note that the utility eﬀect UE(ˆ θ) is now necessarily positive because the
indirect utility in country A is nondecreasing in the second-best.
A new term is speciﬁc to the second-best. It corresponds to an information external-
ity and its expression is – at ﬁrst sight – rather complicated. We will see that it reﬂects
the marginal costs and beneﬁts with regard to incentives of the presence in country
A of the marginal ˆ θ-individuals. These costs and beneﬁts arise from the upward and
downward mimicking behaviours.
Let us assume that the ˆ θ-individuals were living in country B and now relocate to
country A.
• If the participation constraint is active for the ˆ θ-individuals but not for individuals
to the very left of ˆ θ, then the latter are left with a strictly positive location rent.
Note that this implies a negative marginal rent (R′(ˆ θ) < 0). In that case, individ-
uals in the upper tail of the productivity distribution have an incentive to mimic
the most productive agents living in country A to beneﬁt from their higher outside
options. The location rent of the individuals to the very left of ˆ θ must be increased
at the margin, i.e. by an amount −R′(ˆ θ), to induce truthtelling. The shadow price
of this increase is ι(ˆ θ−)−ι(ˆ θ) ≧ 0. Hence, the social cost of the upward mimicking
behaviour is [ι(ˆ θ)−ι(ˆ θ−)]×R′(ˆ θ) ≧ 0, the ﬁrst part of the information externality
IE(ˆ θ). But this is not the end of the story.
• The increase in the location rent also brings about a positive eﬀect on social wel-
fare: because individuals to the very left of ˆ θ have now greater utility, they are less
inclined to mimic less productive individuals. The slope of the indirect utility V ′
A
required for them to reveal their type truthfully is therefore reduced at the margin.
Because ι(ˆ θ−) is the shadow price of the ﬁrst-order condition for incentive com-
patibility (FOIC), the social beneﬁt of this slackening of the downward incentive
compatibility constraints is ι(ˆ θ−)V ′
A. This is the second part of the information
externality IE(ˆ θ).
Combining the positive and negative eﬀects, we obtain the net marginal social cost
incurred to restore an incentive tax scheme at the top. If the information externality
is suﬃciently large, it may prevail over the tax (and utility) eﬀects. Then, it would be
optimum to let the marginal ˆ θ-individuals go abroad.
246.4. Preventing emigration of top earners may be optimum
We now examine cases in which we can establish that it is optimal to keep everyone at
home. We start with the same setting as in Proposition 3: individuals have quasilinear-
in-consumption preferences, the government’s aversion to income inequality is inﬁnite
(maximin), the autarkic second-best indirect utility crosses the reservation utility only
once, from above and the reservation utility is convex. Moreover, the disutility of labour
is isoelastic. Note that the Citizen and Resident criteria coincide under the maximin.
We initially consider the population of measure  1 described by the CDF F1 (θ) over
[θ, ˆ θ]. The optimal allocation is a mapping θ ∈ [θ, ˆ θ] −→ (x1 (θ),z1 (θ)). We call T1 the
corresponding tax schedule. We know from Proposition 3 that the optimum allocation
involves a partition of the population into two connected intervals, the participation
constraint being binding for the top of the population. We now consider a second
population obtained from the ﬁrst one, through the addition of an interval (ˆ θ,θ] of
measure  2 over which the distribution of θ is given by the CDF F2 (θ). The measure of





−→ F1+2 (θ) =
 1
 1 +  2
F1 (θ) +
 2
 1 +  2
F2 (θ). (29)
We construct the following allocation:
• For θ ∈ (θ, ˆ θ], consumption and gross income are unaltered. Individuals pay taxes
given by T1.
• For θ ∈ (ˆ θ,θ], the participation constraint is binding and the incentive com-
patibility constraint is satisﬁed. This is equivalent to the equation of motion
u′
θ(xA(θ),zA(θ);θ) = V ′
B(θ)−c′(θ) and the boundary condition u(xA(ˆ θ),zA(ˆ θ); ˆ θ) =
VB(ˆ θ) − c(ˆ θ). We have established – in the proof of Proposition 3 – that this sys-
tem of two equations has a solution, which deﬁnes the optimum tax over (ˆ θ,θ],
with T2 : (ˆ θ,θ] → T2 (θ) = z2 (θ) − x2 (θ). T2 is non-decreasing over (ˆ θ,θ] because
the participation constraint is binding and c′ ≧ 0 (see Corollary 1 in Simula and
Trannoy (2010)).
For θ ∈ (θ,θ), we have 0 ≦ T′ < 1 on the participation constraint because c′ ≧ 0
(see Corollary 1 in Simula and Trannoy (2010)). Outside the participation constraint,
we have 0 < T′ < 1 (see Simula and Trannoy 2010, formula (32) with γ = 1). Then,
θ ∈ (θ, ˆ θ) −→ T1(θ) is an increasing function of θ. Because VB − c is a C2-function, we







T1 (θ), θ ∈ [θ, ˆ θ]
T2 (θ), θ ∈ (ˆ θ,θ]
(30)
is increasing. In addition, T1(ˆ θ) > 0. Consequently, T1+2 (θ) > 0 for every θ ∈ (ˆ θ,θ].
We have built a new allocation which increases tax revenue and thus social welfare. Tax
receipts are an increasing function of ˆ θ. Consequently, everyone must stay in A in the
social optimum. This result can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 7. Let individuals have quasilinear-in-consumption preferences, with con-
stant elasticity of labour supply, the government’s objective be the maximin, the autarkic
second-best indirect utility cross the reservation utility only once, from above, and let the
reservation utility be convex with nondecreasing migration cost. Under the Citizen and
Resident criteria, we have ˆ θ = θ in the optimum.
We continue with loglinear preferences, given by U(x,ℓ) = logx+log(1−ℓ), and con-
stant migration costs. It is possible to replace a nonlinear tax schedule θ −→ T(zA(θ)) by
a collection of linearized schedules θ −→ (t(θ),m(θ)) such that xA(θ) = (1−t(θ))θℓA(θ)+









We assume that the costs of migration are constant. To satisfy the participation con-
straint on a nondegenerated interval I, we must have R′ (θ) = 0, which is equivalent to
ℓA(θ) = 1/2 and implies m(θ) = 0. Moreover, we must have R(θ) = 0 on this interval,
i.e., t(θ) = 1−exp(−c). Note that t(θ) is constant and belongs to (0,1). The implications
are threefold. First, it is always possible to modify a tax schedule in such a way that
the participation constraint is binding on a given interval. Second, if individuals were
on this interval, they would pay positive taxes, given by t(θ)θℓA(θ) = θ[1 − exp(−c)]/2.
Third and consequently, country A’s policymaker should prevent emigration of the highly
skilled under the maximin (ˆ θR = ˆ θC = θ in the optimum).
Proposition 8. Let individuals have loglinear preferences U(x,ℓ) = logx + log(1 − ℓ),
the policymaker adopt the maximin, and let the costs of migration be constant. In this














Figure 2: Linearized schedule
We next consider separable preferences, given by U(x,ℓ) = h(x) − v(ℓ) and constant
migration costs. Considering separable preferences is interesting because of the Atkinson-
Stiglitz theorem. We assume that the labour supply is such that the substitution eﬀect
prevails over the income eﬀect. We replace a nonlinear tax schedule θ −→ T(zA(θ)) by a
collection of linearized schedules θ −→ (t(θ),m(θ)) such that xA(θ) = (1−t(θ))θℓA(θ)+
m(θ). To satisfy the participation constraint on a nondegenerated interval I, we must
have R′ (θ) = 0, which is equivalent to ℓA(θ) = ℓB(θ). In the t,m space ([0,1] × R)
and given θ, we represent mR′ (t) deﬁned by ℓA(t,m) = ℓB(θ). We know that ℓA(0,0) =
ℓB(θ). Because leisure is a normal good and the substitution eﬀect prevails over the
income eﬀect (∂ℓA/∂t < 0), we have dmR′ (t)/dt < 0. Hence mR′ (t) is decreasing on
[0,1], equal to 0 for t = 0 and strictly negative for t = 1. Moreover, we must have
R(θ) = 0 on I. In the t,m space ([0,1] × R) and given θ, we also represent mR (t)
deﬁned by R(θ) = 0. Because ℓB(θ) is given, we obtain dmR (t)/dt = θℓB(θ) > 0.
We now examine the intersection points between mR (t) and the axes of the t,m space.
Note that (i) when t = 0, we have R(θ) = 0 ⇔ h(θℓB + m) = h(θℓB) − c and (ii)
when m = 0, we have R(θ) = 0 ⇔ h(θℓB(1 − t)) = h(θℓB) − c, which is equivalent to
t = 1 − h−1(h(θℓB) − c)/(θℓB) < 1. Hence, mR (t) is increasing on [0,1], negative for
27t = 0 and strictly positive for t = 1. By continuity and monotonicity, there is a unique
junction point (˜ t, ˜ m) between mR (t) and mR′ (t) for every θ. It is such that ˜ m < 0
and 0 < ˜ t < 1. Consequently, it is always possible to modify the tax schedule in such
a way that the participation constraint is binding on a given interval. Individuals for
whom the participation constraints are binding pay strictly positive taxes, ˜ tθℓB(θ)− ˜ m.
It is therefore socially optimum for country A’s policymaker to prevent emigration of
the highly skilled under the maximin (ˆ θR = ˆ θC = θ in the optimum).
Proposition 9. Let individuals have separable preferences U(x,ℓ) = h(x)−v(ℓ), let the
policymaker adopt the maximin, and let the costs of migration be constant. When the
substitution eﬀect on labour supply prevails over the income eﬀect, it is socially optimal
to design the tax schedule so that everyone decides to stay in the home country, under
the Citizen and Resident criteria.
In other words, we have exhibited three cases in which the optimum tax schedule is
the same under the National, Citizen and Resident criteria. The ﬁrst case is not implied
by the third one: we consider nondecreasing migration costs in the ﬁrst and constant
costs in the third. The second case is not included in the third one: with loglinear
preferences, the labour supply is backwards bending and thus the substitution eﬀect
does not prevail over the income eﬀect as in the third case.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper provides a ﬁrst example of the introduction of type-dependent participa-
tion constraints in the optimal income tax framework. These constraints interact with
the incentive constraints in a non-trivial way and make the structure of the mimicking
behaviour more complex than in closed economy.
Consequently, a new trade-oﬀ between maintaining the redistribution programme
and preserving national productive capacities adds to the traditional trade-oﬀ between
equity and eﬃciency. We are not able to establish that emigration of the highly skilled
individuals should be prevented to maximize social welfare in all cases. However, in the
important Ralwsian case, we show that in the interest of the worst-oﬀ the best-oﬀ must
stay at home. It remains an open question to know whether the statement is still valid
for other social preferences.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Let π′ and γ be the Lagrange multipliers of (9) and (5) respec-
tively. Under Assumption 1, the solution is interior and the SOC are satisﬁed. Hence,










ℓ = −γθ, (A.1)
with






ρ > 0, (A.1) and (A.2) imply γ > 0.
The proof employs the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let J be a non-empty open interval where π′ ≡ 0. Then for all θ ∈ J, (a)
V ′
A (θ) < 0 when 0 ≤ ρ < ∞, (b) V ′
A (θ) = 0 when ρ → ∞.
Proof of the Lemma. Assumption 2 holds if and only if dℓ/dT > 0. Since π′ ≡ 0, applying























where the square bracket is strictly positive because U is strictly quasi-concave under
Assumption 1. Therefore, Assumption 2 is equivalent to
θU′′
xx + U′′
xℓ < 0. (A.4)
(a) Since π′ ≡ 0, (A.1) yields θ = U′
x/U′






















Let A be the ﬁrst matrix on the LHS. As |A| > 0 under Assumption 1,
￿















A (θ) = u′
xx′ (θ) + u′














ℓ, i.e., as θU′′
xx−U′′
xℓ. Hence, by (A.4), V ′
A (θ) <
0.
(b) The result directly follows from duality.














economy solution violates (4); so there are θ such that π′ > 0 at the solution to Problem
1. It remains to show that π′ (θ) > 0 for all θ > θ∗.
29By (A.1), π′ (θ) = γ/U′
x − φ′
ρ, which implies under Assumption 1 and the continuity






: π′ (θ) = 0
￿
exists. Then, by
continuity of π′, there exists θ′′ > θ′ such that π′ = 0 on [θ′,θ′′]. By continuity of R,
R(θ′) = 0. On [θ′,θ′′], V ′
A ≤ 0 by Lemma 2 and V ′
B − c′ > 0 under Assumption 3. Then
R < 0 for θ ∈ (θ′,θ′′), contradicting (9). Hence, θ′ does not exist.
Proof of Proposition 3. Step 1: We use hats for the initial allocation and breves for the
new one. We show that the new allocation is incentive-compatible. It is such that:
˘ VA (θ) =
￿
VB (θ) − c(θ) for every θ ∈ [θ−,θ+],
ˆ VA (θ) otherwise.
(A.8)
By construction, the participation constraint is satisﬁed.
(1) The allocation (ˆ xA, ˘ zA) satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition for incentive compati-
bility:
a) for θ / ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗]: because the indirect utility is unaltered, the envelope condition
remains satisﬁed.
b) for θ ∈ [θ−,θ+]: By deﬁnition of ˘ VA, the individuals are on the participation
constraint. The envelope condition for incentive-compatibility must be satisﬁed. For
that to be the case, we must have
v′ (ℓA (θ))ℓA (θ)
θ
= V ′




In addition, using the ﬁrst-order condition of the individual utility maximisation pro-
gramme, we note that v′ (ℓA (θ)) = θ(1 − ˘ T′ (θℓA (θ))) and, thus,
ℓA (θ) = v′−1[θ(1 − ˘ T′ (θℓA (θ)))]. (A.10)
Combining (A.9) and (A.10), we obtain
(1 − ˘ T′ (θ)) × v′−1[θ(1 − ˘ T′ (θ))] = V ′
B (θ) − c′ (θ). (A.11)
We study the monotonicity of the LHS with respect to ˘ T′:
−v′−1[θ(1 − ˘ T′ (θ))] −
θ(1 − ˘ T′ (θ))
v′′[θ(1 − ˘ T′ (θ))]
< 0. (A.12)
If ˘ T′ = 0, the LHS of (A.11) is equal to v′−1 (θ) while the RHS is equal to v′−1 (θ)−c′ (θ).
For every θ, there exists a solution in ˘ T′. There are indeed three cases. For constant
migration costs, ˘ T′ = 0 is the solution along the participation constraint. For decreasing
migration costs, ˘ T′ < 0 is the solution along participation constraints. For increasing
migration costs, the RHS is strictly larger than the LHS. We know that the solution is
such that ˘ T′ > 0. It remains to establish that ˘ T′ < 1. If ˘ T′ = 1, ℓA (θ) = 0 and by
assumption V ′
B (θ) − c′ (θ) > 0. Then, by the mean value theorem, there exists a ˘ T′ in
(0,1).
30(2) The allocation (ˆ xA, ˘ zA) satisﬁes the second-order condition for incentive compat-
ibility.
Because the initial allocation (ˆ xA, ˆ zA) is incentive-compatible, ˘ zA is non-decreasing
in θ outside [θ−,θ+]. Because the reservation utility is convex, ˘ zA is non-decreasing in
θ on [θ−,θ+]. Moreover, by construction, ˘ zA (θ−) = ˆ zA (θ−) and ˘ zA (θ+) = ˆ zA (θ+).
Therefore, ˘ zA is non-decreasing for the whole population.
Step 2: We show that the new tax schedule increases tax revenue.
For θ / ∈ [θ−,θ+], gross income is constant by construction. Hence, ˘ T (θ) = ˆ T (θ).
For θ ∈ [θ−,θ+], utility is decreased. Because consumption remained ﬁxed and the
utility is decreasing in gross income, a reduction in utility is associated with an increase
in gross income for everyone in this interval. Hence, ˘ T (θ) = ˘ zA (θ) − ˆ xA (θ) > ˆ T (θ) =




˘ T (θ)dF (θ) >
R
θ
ˆ T (θ)dF (θ).
The tax adjusment is incentive-compatible and increases tax revenue, i.e., social
welfare. Therefore, the initial schedule cannot be socially optimal.
Proof of Proposition 4. zA is control variable; VA and G(θ) :=
R θ
θ T (zA (τ))dF (τ) are
state variables. Since T := zA−xA, Leibnitz’s rule yields G′ (θ) = (zA (θ) − xA (θ))f (θ).
The isoperimetric constraint (5) is taken into account through G′ and the boundary




= 0. It is not necessary to take xA explicitly into account
because it is uniquely determined by VA and zA. Let xA = h(VA,zA;θ); diﬀerentiating
shows ∂xA/∂VA = 1/u′
x and ∂xA/∂zA = s. The Hamiltonian and Lagrangian are
respectively:
HN = φρ (VA)f + ιu′
θ + γ (zA − xA)f,









x, necessary conditions are:
∂HN/∂zA = 0 ⇔ ιu′
xs′
θ − γ (1 − s)f = 0, (A.13)
∂LN/∂VA = −ι′ ⇔ ι′ (θ) = −φ′
ρ (VA)f − ιu′′
θx/u′
x − π′ + γf/u′
x, (A.14)














ι(θ) ≤ 0 (= 0 when R(θ) > 0), (A.17)
π′ (θ) ≥ 0, R(θ) ≥ 0, π′ (θ)R(θ) = 0, (A.18)
ι(θ−
j ) − ι(θ+
j ) = π(θ+
j ) − π(θ−
j ) ≥ 0 (= 0 if R(θj) > 0). (A.19)
γ is constant and strictly positive. Because s = 1 − T′, T′ = ιu′
xs′
θ/(γf) by (A.13). In
addition, using basic calculus,
￿
1 + eM (θ)
￿
/eH (θ) = −θs′
θ/s. Hence,
T′




1 + eM (θ)
eH (θ)
. (A.20)
31When θ = θ, (A.20) and (A.16) yield (23). When θ < θ, (A.20) can be rewritten as
T′
1 − T′ = −
ιu′
x
γ (1 − F (θ))
1 + eM (θ)
eH (θ)
1 − F (θ)
θf (θ)
, (A.21)




















x (.;τ′)dτ′. The following relation has been proved by















































that we plug in (A.21).
Proof of Proposition 5. Citizen criterion: By deﬁnition, WC
A,ρ(ˆ θ) is maximum when ˆ θ =
ˆ θC, i.e. when WC
A,ρ(ˆ θC) is maximized with respect to (xA,zA) subject to (FOIC), (9),
(5). The FOC are the same as (A.13)–(A.19), except that θ is replaced by ˆ θC. We then
proceed as in the proof of Proposition 4.
Resident criterion: By deﬁnition, WR
A,ρ(ˆ θ) is maximum when ˆ θ = ˆ θR, i.e. when
WR
A,ρ(ˆ θR) is maximized with respect to (xA,zA) subject to (FOIC), (9), (5). The FOC
are the same as (A.13)–(A.19), except that (i) θ is replaced by ˆ θR and (ii) φ′
ρ (VA) is
divided by F(ˆ θR). We then proceed as in the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 6. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: We ﬁrst state necessary conditions for a maximum in Subproblem 1. These
conditions are the same under the National and Resident criteria since ˆ θ is given. ζA :=
z′
A is control variable; zA, VA and G are state variables; η, ι and γ are adjoint variables.
(SOIC) is transformed into g (ζA) ≥ 0 to avoid dealing with singular solutions, where g
is a C2-function such that g′ > 0 and g (0) = 0. The Hamiltonian and Lagrangian are
Hi = φρ (VA)f + ηζA + ιu′
θ + γ (zA − xA)f,
Li = HR + π′R + κg (ζA),
32with i = {N,R}. A solution to Subproblem 1 must satisfy:
∂Li/∂ζA = 0 ⇔ η + κg′ (ζA) = 0, (A.25)
η′ = −∂Li/∂zA ⇔ η′ = ιu′
xs′
θ − γ (1 − s)f, (A.26)




x − π′, (A.27)
γ′ = −∂Li/∂G ⇔ γ′ = 0, (A.28)
π′ ≥ 0, R ≥ 0, π′R = 0, (A.29)
κ ≥ 0, g (ζA) ≥ 0, κg (ζA) = 0, (A.30)





ι(θ) ≤ 0 (= 0 if R(θ) > 0), (A.32)
ι(ˆ θ) ≥ 0 (= 0 if R(ˆ θ) > 0), (A.33)
ι(θ−
j ) − ι(θ+
j ) = π(θ+
j ) − π(θ−
j ) ≥ (= 0 if R(θj) > 0). (A.34)
η is continuous (see Eq. (75), p. 375, in S-S). We check that γ > 0. In addition, by
continuity of η and (A.31),
η(ˆ θ−)ζA(ˆ θ) = η(ˆ θ)ζA(ˆ θ) = 0. (A.35)
Step 2: We now turn to Subproblem 2. By Leibnitz’s rule,
∂WC
































π(ˆ θ) − π(ˆ θ−)
i
R′(ˆ θ). (A.38)
Using the continuity of xA, zA, f, VA, (A.35), (A.34), T = zA − xA, and the fact that
(4) is active at ˆ θ, (A.36) and (A.37), we obtain the expressions in the proposition.
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